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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports in Jordan, and its objectives are: (1) 
To measure the voluntary disclosure level in the annual reports of Jordanian companies listed in Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE). (2) To examine the relationship between a number of explanatory variables and the level of 
voluntary disclosure. Unweighted disclosure index consisting of 63 voluntary items was developed to assess the 
level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 124 listed companies on ASE for the period of 2010 to 2012. 
Univariate and Multivariate analysis were applied to explore the relationship between each explanatory variables 
and the level of voluntary disclosure and a number of sensitivity tests were taken to further analysis. The 
findings of the study reveal that the level of voluntary disclosure in Jordanian corporate annual reports is low (its 
average is 35.7% for three years), although there is a significant increase in the level of voluntary disclosure 
from year to year. Univariate analysis reveals that firm size, leverage, firm age, profitability, liquidity, board size 
and audit committee size have a significant positive relationship with the level of voluntary disclosure while 
independent directors and ownership structure have a significant negative relationship with the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Meanwhile, multivariate analysis reveals same results to Univariate analysis except leverage has no 
impact on the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Keywords: voluntary disclosure, governance attributes, firm characteristics, Amman stock exchange 
1. Introduction 
Information should be prepared, audited, and disclosed in accordance with high quality accounting standards. 
Stakeholders and potential investors require access to regular, reliable and comparable information in details for 
them to assess the stewardship of management, and make informed decisions. A strong disclosure regime 
enhances transparency, and it is a powerful tool for influencing the behavior of stakeholders. It results in the 
attraction of more capital, sustains investors’ confidence in the capital market, and possibly prevents fraud. 
Inadequate information may increase the cost of capital and result in a poor allocation of resources. Moreover, 
the business environment has witnessed changes over the years, mainly been influenced by globalization and 
technological innovation. Companies worldwide are now trying to penetrate international capital markets. 
Therefore, the disclosure of adequate and reliable information is necessary. 
In recent years Amman Stock Exchange has experienced remarkable increases in trading volumes, market 
capitalization and the number of corporations listed on the market; for instance, market financial capitalization 
has almost tripled over the last five years. In addition, the market is expected to gain from the recent political 
development in the region, the importance of disclosure in a market economy cannot be overemphasized if 
scarce resources are to be distributed to their most productive uses. Further, it is widely acknowledged that the 
quality of investment decisions depends, to a large extent, on the quality and quantity of information available to 
investors. The general purpose of this study therefore is to extend our knowledge about the disclosure practices, 
mainly, voluntary disclosure, in corporate annual reports of Jordanian companies listed on the ASE. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development      
2.1 Firm-Specific Characteristics 
2.1.1 Firm Size 
The general hypothesis is that a company’s disclosure practice is positively associated to its size. One of the 
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reasons can support the positive effect of company size on corporate disclosure derived from the agency theory. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) have confirmed that agency costs are likely to increase with the proportion of 
outside capital. Given that the proportion of outside capital tends to be higher for large companies, it is 
reasonable to speculate that large companies are more likely to provide more information in an attempt to reduce 
their agency costs. Several proxies have been suggested and used as measures of size like total assets, sales, and 
net income. Literature found evidence that larger firms disclose more information (Allegrini & Greco, 2011; 
Bhayani, 2012; Alves et al., 2012).  
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between firm size of the firm and the level of voluntary disclosure 
found in annual reports. 
2.1.2 Leverage 
Leverage may influence the level of voluntary disclosure. For example, a high leverage ratio may improve 
disclosure policy for managers and encourage them to disclose more information to meet investors’ interests. on 
the other hand, a low ratio could encourage managers to orient their disclosure procedure toward shareholders 
more than creditors. Accordingly, managers are motivated to disclose more data in their financial reports to 
lower their costs and to avoid any creditors’ claims. A number of researchers did not find any relationship 
between leverage and the disclosure level (Aksu & Kosedag, 2006). Nevertheless, other research found a 
positive relationship (Kolsi, 2012; Hajji & Ghazali, 2013). In addition, other studies Allegrini and Greco (2011) 
Nandi and Ghosh (2012) Bhayani (2012) discovered a negative relationship between leverage and the disclosure 
level. 
H2: There is a significant positive relationship between leverage and the level of voluntary disclosure found in 
annual reports. 
2.1.3 Firm Age 
There are several theoretical grounds to assume that older companies are more likely to disclose more 
information than younger ones. For example, the competition argument proposes that young companies are not 
likely to disclose full information about their financial results and position, because this may prove to be 
detrimental if sensitive information is disclosed to the established competitors. In contrast, old companies are 
less likely to be motivated to withhold such information since their competitive advantages cannot be easily 
challenged with increased disclosure (Owusu, 1998). This is because they are long established and it is likely 
that the market is already aware of these advantages. Hossain and Hammami (2009) have found a positive 
relationship between firm age and the level of voluntary disclosure, other researchers did not find any 
relationship between Firm age and the level of voluntary disclosure (Bhayani, 2012), in our research firm age 
measured by number of years since foundation. 
H3: There is a significant positive relationship between firm age of the firm and the level of voluntary disclosure 
found in annual reports. 
2.1.4 Profitability  
There is a general proposition that a company’s willingness to disclose information is positively related to its 
profitability. One motive for this can be derived from agency theory. It is suggested that managers of profitable 
companies disclose extensive information in order to show and explain to shareholders that they are acting in 
their best interests and justify their compensation packages. Previous studies employed different measures of 
profitability like return on total assets and return on equity. The findings of previous research regarding the 
relationship between profitability and voluntary disclosure using one or more of these measures are rather varied. 
Hossain and Hammami (2009), Kolsi (2012) and Bhayani (2012) indicated a significant positive relationship, 
while Glaum and Street (2003) provided no evidence of relationship between company profitability and level of 
voluntary disclosure. 
H4: There is a significant positive relationship between firm profitability and the level of voluntary disclosure 
found in annual reports. 
2.1.5 Liquidity 
Signaling theory suggests, according to Abd-Elsalam (1999) that firms enjoying a high liquidity ratio are 
disposed to disclose more information to be distinguished from other companies suffering from a lower liquidity 
ratio. On the other hand, agency theory argues that firms with a low percentage of liquidity disclose more 
information in order to lower the conflict between shareholders and creditors (Abd-Elsalam, 1999). 
Contradictions not only occur among theories but also among empirical results. For example Nandi and Ghosh 
www.ccsenet.org/ibr International Business Research Vol. 8, No. 3; 2015 
3 
 
(2012) revealed a positive connection between liquidity ratio and disclosure for Canadian firms (this evidence 
supports signaling). Conversely, Al shammari et al. (2008) supported the agency theory prospective, because 
they found that Spanish firms undergoing a low liquidity ratio revealed more financial disclosure. Nevertheless  
Hancock and Izan (2006) did not support either of those theories, as they found no relationship between liquidity 
and the level of disclosure. 
H5: There is a significant positive relationship between liquidity and the level of voluntary disclosure found in 
annual reports. 
2.2 Corporate Governance Related Variables 
2.2.1 Independent Directors 
One of the variables increasingly used in recent disclosure studies is the ratio of independent directors on the 
board. Inclusion of outside directors on the board might enhance the viability of the board as an internal control, 
prevent expropriation of security holder wealth, attenuate agency costs and create pressure for better disclosure. 
If independent directors on the board actually conduct their controlling and monitoring role, good corporate 
governance is strengthened (Chau & Gray, 2010), boards effectiveness is enhanced (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002), 
disclosure quality is improved and more information disclosure is expected. The results of previous studies are 
not consistent in relation to the association between proportion of independent directors on the board and the 
level of voluntary disclosure. Some studies found positive significant association between the two variables 
(Chau & Gray, 2010; Rouf, 2012), some studies found negative association (Gul & Leung, 2004) and some 
others found no significant association (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Alves et al., 2012).  
H6: There is a significant positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors on the board and 
the level of voluntary disclosure found in annual reports. 
2.2.2 Audit Committee Size 
Limited research has been undertaken to investigate the relationship between voluntary disclosure and the 
features of audit committee. Forker (1992) was the first paper to propose this relationship. The author suggests 
that the audit committee is as an effective monitoring mechanism to enhance the quality of corporate disclosure 
and reduce agency costs. Furthermore, Ho and Wong (2001) argue that the existence of an audit committee 
significantly influences the amount of corporate disclosure. In others empirical studies (Barako et al., 2006) 
conclude the predictable positive connection between audit committee size and level of voluntary disclosure. 
H7: There is a positive relationship between audit committee size and the level of voluntary disclosure found in 
annual reports. 
2.2.3 Board Size 
Board size is a significant corporate governance characteristic. Board size has a positive effect on the level of 
corporate voluntary disclosure (Samaha et al., 2012; Nadndi & Ghosh, 2012; Hassan, 2013). Larger boards are 
more efficient for corporate performance since they have a wide range of collective experience and expertise that 
may assist in making better decisions.  
H8: There is positive relationship between board size and the level of voluntary disclosure found in annual 
reports. 
2.2.4 Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure is one of the mechanisms that associate the interest of shareholders and mangers. unlike the 
UK and the US which have dispersed ownership, ownership in Jordanian public listed companies are much more 
concentrated or owned by the insider, so that’s why this study uses managerial ownership as proxy to measure 
ownership structure. Previous studies found a positive relationship between managerial ownership and disclosure 
in the US (Nagar et al., 2003) in Malaysia (Mohd-Nasir & Weetman, 2006) and in Hong Kong (Leung & 
Horwitz, 2004).  
H9: There is a significant a positive a relationship between managerial ownership and the level of voluntary 
disclosure found in annual reports. 
2.2.5 Control Variables 
To test the main hypotheses, this thesis includes a number of control variables (Industry type, auditing firm, 
listing status). These control variables are included, as they are reported in the literature to be associated with 
voluntary disclosure. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Sample and Data Collection 
To be included in the sample, listed firms must satisfy the following selection criteria in order to test the 
hypotheses developed: 
 Firms must be listed continuously on ASE in (2010-2012) three years’ annual reports are available for 
examination. 
 Financial firms are excluded from the sample, as they are subject to a different accounting system and 
disclosure requirements in Jordan. 
3.2 Measurement of the Level of Voluntary Disclosure 
To determine the disclosure level of voluntary items, earlier studies have utilized two approaches: weighted (Ho 
& Wong, 2001) or unweighted index (Chau & Gray, 2010). The utilization of a weighted disclosure index has 
been criticized since it may introduce a bias towards a particular user orientation (Barako et al., 2006), and is 
based on a subjective importance rating ranked by the researchers (Alsaeed, 2006). Therefore, we adopted 
unweighted index in this research, this approach is most appropriate when no importance is given to any specific 
user groups (Hossain & Hammami, 2009). The items of information are numerically scored on a dichotomous 
basis. According to the unweighted disclosure approach, a firm is scored (1) for an item disclosed in the annual 
report and (0) if it is not disclosed. The total voluntary disclosure index is then computed for each sample firm as 
a ratio of the total disclosure score to the maximum possible disclosure by the firm. The disclosure index for 
each firm is then expressed as a percentage. 
3.3 Model Specification 
A secondary method for data collection has been used in this study. The data set for variables is collected from 
financial information available on the websites of companies. The information on independent as well as control 
variables is also collected from annual reports of the companies. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is 
employed to examine the relationship between variables. 
Voluntary Disclosure Index= β0 + β1 lnASST +β2 LEV + β3 AGY + β4 ROA+β5 LIQ + β6 PIND + β7 ACS + β8 
BSZE + β9 SOE + β10 INDU + β11 BIGFOUR + β12 LS+ e 
3.4 Explanatory Variables 
 
Table 1. Independent and control variables identification 
Hypothesis Variables Label Measurement Exp. sign 
H1 Firm size lnASST log of total assets + 
H2 Leverage LEV Total liabilities/ Total assets + 
H3 Firm age AGY Number of years since foundation + 
H4 Profitability ROA Return/Total assets (ROA) + 
H5 Liquidity LIQ current assets / current liabilities + 
H6 Independent directors PIND Number of independent directors/Total number of directors 
on the board of directors 
+ 
H7 Audit committee size ACS The total number of member on the audit committee + 
H8 Board size BSZE The total number of member on the Board size + 
H9 Ownership structure SOE Percentage of equity owned by the insiders (directors, 
managers) to all equity of the firm. 
+ 
Industry type  INDU Dummy variable: 1= manufacturing firm and 0= Service 
Firm. 
 
Auditor type  BIGFOUR Dummy variable: 1= if a firm’s auditor is an international 
audit firm ( big 4) 0= if a firm’s auditor is other 
 
Listing status  LS Dummy variable: (1= first tier, 0=other tier).  
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4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
4.1.1 Extent of Voluntary Disclosure: Overall Disclosure 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of the level of voluntary disclosure. The voluntary disclosure scores 
range from 15.4% to 83.1%, with a mean score of 35.7%. It can be seen from the percentage change of scores 
over the three periods that there is a significant positive trend of voluntary disclosure. It can be seen from Table 2 
that the highest disclosure score in the sample set is 84.1% which occurred in 2012.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of overall voluntary disclosure scores 
Year Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
2010 0.321 0.142 0.124 0.636 
2011 0.345 0.174 0.145 0.715 
2012 0.383 0.532 0.191 0.841 
Total 0.357 0.135 0.154 0.831 
 
Table 3 shows the number and percentages of companies whose disclosure score is within the specified range. 
8.40% companies disclose voluntary information less than of 20%; 8.98% companies disclosure in the range of 
(21 to 30)%. 31.30% companies disclosure in the range of (31 to 40)% and 22.31 and 21.73% companies 
disclose voluntary information in the range of (41 to 50)% and (51 to 60)% respectively. 2.89% companies 
disclosure in the range of (61 to 70)%; 2.60% companies disclose voluntary information in the range of (71 to 
80)%; 1.73% companies disclose more than 80% voluntary information in the annual reports of listed companies 
of Jordan.  
 
Table 3. Frequency distribution of voluntary disclosure scores 
Disclosure score (%) No of cases % 
<=20 29 8.40 
21 to 30 31 8.98 
31 to 40 108 31.30 
41 to 50 77 22.31 
51 to 60 75 21.73 
61 to 70 10 2.89 
71 to 80 9 2.60 
>80 6 1.73 
 
Table 4. The descriptive statistics for dependent and Independent variables 
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Dep. Variable      
VD 345 0.357 0.135 0.154 0.831 
Indep. Variable      
LnASST 345 42.264 1.836 21.335 63.554 
LEV 345 34.972 34.282 0.312 247.690 
AGY 345 15.584 20.214 7.000 54.000 
ROA 345 0.162 0.231 -0.167 0.483 
LIQ 345 2.438 2.013 0.114 9.529 
PIND 345 0.321 0.362 0.000 0.865 
ACS 345 3.045 0.188 3.000 6.000 
BSZE 345 8.597 2.219 5.000 14.000 
SOE 345 0. 484 0.223 0.061 0.986 
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Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the independent variables examined in explaining the variability in 
voluntary disclosure practices. The results from the disclosure index indicate that the level of average voluntary 
disclosure in the sample companies is 35.7% the highest score achieved by a firm is 83.1% and the lowest score 
is 15.4% with a standard deviation of 0.13%. So the firms are widely distributed with regard to voluntary 
disclosure. 
4.2 Univariate Analysis 
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix of the variables, it shows a number of strong correlations between some 
explanatory variables. This implies the possibility of Multicollinearity problems. The largest reported correlation 
value among the variables as shown in Table 5 (0.545) was between listing status and board independence 
variable. However, this value is still lower than the critical value of 0.80 according to (Cooper & Schindler, 
2008). Hence, Multicollinearity between the independent variables is not considered a serious problem.  
 
Table 5. Correlation statistics for variables used in the analyses 
Variables VD lnASST LEV AGE ROA LIQ PIND ACS BSZE SOE INDU BIG4 LS 
VD 1.000             
lnASST 0.411** 1.000            
LEV 0.106* 0.331** 1.000           
AGY 0.113* 0.047 0.026 1.000          
ROA 0.212** 0.322** 0.024 0.004 1.000         
LIQ 0.116* -0.081 0.342** 0.112* 0.183** 1.000        
PIND -0.243** 0.165* 0.066 0.034 -0.065 0.048 1.000       
ACS 0.127* 0.134* 0.081 0.271** 0.075 0.028 0.002 1.000      
BSZE 0.313** 0.296** 0.203** 0.065 0.016 0.113* 0.433** 0.053 1.000     
SOE -0.261** -0.231** 0.076 -0.342** -0.068 -0.051 -0.179* 0.023 -0.186** 1.000    
INDU 0.111* 0.013 0.175** 0.234** -0.136* -0.128* 0.144* 0.016 0.275** 0.051 1.000   
BIG4 0.182** 0.138* 0.221** 0.197** 0.051 -0.013 0.126* -0.053 0.133* 0.049 0.285** 1.000  
LS 0.116* 0.037 0.034 0.177** 0.057 0.038 0.545** 0.043 0.118* 0.015 0.011 0.006 1.000 
Note. (**) indicates significant at 1% level; * indicates significance at 5% level (two-tailed). 
 
4.3 Multivariate Analysis 
The R² measures how much variation in the response variable the predictors in the model can explain. For this 
research as shows in Table 6 the R² are approximately 54.1%, 58.8%, and 61.3% for the year 2010 to 2012, 
respectively. The R² is low for the year 2010. However, the R², increased significantly in (2011-2012).  
The adjusted R² improved approximately from 52% in 2010 to 57% in 2011 and 59% in 2012. Consequently, the 
explanatory powers of the model increased over the years. However, the year 2012 seems to produce a better 
explanatory model compared to 2011 and 2010. Furthermore, Table 6 shows F-statistic with its significance. This 
is the goodness of fit test, which indicates, overall, the quality of the models to predict the outcome variable. The 
models of 2010, 2011 and 2012 have a significant value below 0.10. This implies that the models are statistically 
significant. Consequently, at least 90% confidence exists that the models can explain the dependent variable. All 
of these values suggest that a significant percentage of the variation in voluntary disclosure can be explained by 
the variations in the whole set of independent variables. 
The results for 2010, 2011 and 2012 nearly same where the coefficient shows a positive and significant 
relationship with the VD for some variables, which implies that (LNASST, AGE, ROA, ACS, BSIZE, LIQ) have 
a positive effect on the level of voluntary disclosure. This is in contrast with was hypothesized. This implies that, 
the higher (LNASST, AGE, ROA, ACS, BSIZE, LIQ), the higher level of voluntary disclosure. The coefficient 
of (PIND, SOE) has a negative and significant relationship at level of 0.05 with the level of voluntary disclosure. 
This implies that, the higher (PIND, SOE), the lower level of voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, the coefficient 
of (LEV) does not have significant influence the level of voluntary disclosure. 
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Moreover, all control variables have a positive and significant relationship with the level of voluntary disclosure. 
All hypothesizes are supported by the results of the regression model of 2010-2011-2012 beyond (H2, H6, H9) 
Where the results do not support hypothesis (2) which suggest that: A positive relationship exists between (LEV) 
and the level of voluntary disclosure. The (LEV) has a positive relationship with the level of voluntary disclosure 
and is not significant, implying that with a 90 % level of confidence, cannot state that the estimate is true. 
The results also do not support hypothesis (6) and hypothesis (9) which suggest that: A positive relationship 
exists between each of (PIND), (SOE) and the level of voluntary disclosure. The (PIND), (SOE) have a negative 
and significant relationship at level of 0.05 with the level of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Table 6. Multiple regression results (year-wise) 
Variables Model (2010) Model (2011) Model (2012) Full model 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 4.656 0.000 5.876 0.000 5.476 0.000 5.236 0.000 
Firm characteristics related variables        
lnASST 0.165 0.000*** 0.198 0.000*** 0.287 0.000*** 0.178 0.000*** 
LEV 0.029 0.137 0.021 0.149 0.065 0.121 0.043 0.153 
AGY 0.081 0.023** 0.073 0.027** 0.086 0.014** 0.083 0.019** 
ROA 0.063 0.064* 0.046 0.076* 0.085 0.038** 0.072 0.056* 
LIQ 0.042 0.068* 0.038 0.0 17** 0.054 0.011** 0.048 0.014** 
Corporate governance related variables        
PIND -0.023 0.024** -0.036 0.041** -0.043 0.049** -0.033 0.045** 
ACS 0.074 0.014** 0.068 0.049** 0.047 0.051* 0.058 0.041** 
BSZE 0.064 0.037** 0.026 0.074* 0.053 0.043** 0.030 0.076* 
SOE -0.053 0.032** -0.018 0.027** -0.056 0.043** -0.041 0.024** 
Control variables         
INDU 0. 128 0.011 ** 0. 114 0.012 ** 0. 112 0.034** 0. 103 0.021** 
BIGFOUR 0.076 0.039** 0.157 0.018** 0.025 0.064* 0.047 0.024** 
LS 0.031 0.065* 0.046 0.039** 0.156 0.000*** 0.038 0.041** 
F-statistic 10.974  13.423  15.756  28.367  
F-sig 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
R2 0.541  0.588  0.613  0.584  
Adjusted R2 0.521  0.574  0.591  0.570  
Note. (***) indicates significance at 1% level; (**) indicates significance at 5% level and (*) indicates significance at 10% level. The 
reported p-values are all two-tailed except intercept.  
 
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis  
A number of sensitivity tests are performed, in which some alternative measures, for some variables, are used. 
Generally, the results of sensitivity tests are consistent with reported regression results.  
4.4.1 Alternative Measures 
Using the number of employees as an alternative measure of firm size. Since many variables used in the 
regression analyses are correlated with firm size as measured by log of total assets size, firm size as one of firm 
characteristic variables can also measure by number of employees. (Because as we have seen before this variable 
has high correlation nearly with all variables, we undertake the following sensitivity analyses to test whether the 
study’s main results are driven by size effects.). The findings additional regressions reflect the same results, as 
they reflect a positive and significant association between Firm size (number of employees) and dependent 
variables (Coeff. = 0.067 and p-value = 0.041**).  
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As we have seen before within Jordanian listed firms, higher leverage firm’s is not necessary to provide extra 
information beyond mandatory disclosure requirements and as we know besides the ratio of total debt (liabilities) 
to total assets, other leverage measure considered in this study include the ratio of long term debt to owners' 
equity. This alternative leverage measure is significantly and negatively (Coeff. = -0.016 and p-value = 0.071*) 
associated with the level of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Table 7. Sensitivity analysis, alternative measures 
Variable Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 5.154 0.000 
Firm characteristics related variables   
EMPNUM 0.067 0.041** 
LEV -0.016 0.071* 
AGY 0.076 0.028** 
ROA 0.059 0.071* 
LIQ 0.047 0.092* 
Corporate governance related variables   
PIND -0.031 0.037** 
ACS 0.067 0.048** 
BSZE 0.058 0.041** 
SOE  -0.049 0.047** 
Control variables   
INDU 0. 112 0.024 ** 
BIGFOUR 0.071 0.047** 
LS 0.024 0.069* 
F-statistic 26.428  
F-sig 0.000  
R2 0.562  
Adjusted R2 0.554  
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The answer for research question 1: The evidence reported that in aggregate, the general level of voluntary 
disclosure by Jordanian listed firms is arguably low (with the mean of 38.6%). The results support the 
expectation that the level of voluntary disclosure in Jordan as an emerging capital market with secretive culture 
is low, however. It is also found that companies manage their voluntary disclosure policy which is not a random 
practice but subject to certain influences. Maybe one of the reasons for this low level of voluntary disclosure is 
the lack of effective regulation and law enforcement by the stock exchange regulatory bodies may contribute to 
the low level of information transparency, particularly voluntary disclosure. In general, we can indicate that there 
is room to improve the transparency of the Jordanian capital market. The study highlights the possibility of 
cooperation between the capital market authority and all interested parties to enhance transparency by providing 
pattern of voluntary disclosure and corporate governance practice. 
The answer for research question 2: The evidence reported that in aggregate, The statistical results indicate that 
concerning on firm characteristics, the findings support the evidence from the majority of prior literature of the 
positive relationship between total voluntary disclosure and each of firm size, firm age, profitability and liquidity. 
However, leverage as measured by the ratio of total debt (liabilities) to total assets was not related to total 
voluntary disclosure and negative association with total voluntary disclosure as measured by the ratio of long 
term debt to owners’ equity. Concerning on corporate governance attributes do affect the level of voluntary 
disclosure in firm annual reports. Four variables were found to be associated with the level of total voluntary 
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disclosure in firm annual reports; two positively and two negatively. Board size and audit committee size, were 
found to have positive significant association with the level of total voluntary disclosure. However, the 
percentage of independent directors and ownership structure were found to be negatively associated with total 
voluntary disclosure. 
The focus of this study was limited to one source of information, the annual report. Although annual reports are 
considered to be the most important source of information, there are other sources of information in Jordan that 
could be useful for decision making, such as interim reports, ASE publications, prospectuses, internet sources 
and financial press releases. These sources of information sources were not included in this study and might 
form important data sources for future research disclosure studies. Moreover, the recent developments in 
technology and communications suggest a need to pay more attention to internet sources of information. This 
study focused upon one country, mainly Jordan. An extension of the study could be to compare disclosure 
between Jordan and other developing countries in the Middle East. Collecting data for more companies in 
different countries, especially those with different disclosure regulations would enhance the validation of the 
results in this study and would determine the differences and similarities in policy makers’ decisions across the 
region. Such studies would be useful to the literature on comparative international accounting. 
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